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Abstract
This paper provides an analytically tractable general-equilibrium model of money demand
with micro-foundations. The model is based on the incomplete-market model of Bewley (1980)
where money serves as a store of value and provides liquidity to smooth consumption. The
model is applied to study the e⁄ects of monetary policies. It is shown that heterogeneous
liquidity demand can lead to sluggish movements in aggregate prices and positive responses
from aggregate output to transitory money injections. However, permanent money growth can
be extremely costly: With log utility function and an endogenously determined distribution of
money balances that matches the household data, agents are willing to reduce consumption by
8% (or more) to avoid 10% annual in￿ ation. The large welfare cost of in￿ ation arises because
in￿ ation destroys the liquidity value and the bu⁄er-stock function of money, thus raising the
volatility of consumption for low-income households. The astonishingly large welfare cost of
moderate in￿ ation provides a justi￿cation for adopting a low in￿ ation target by central banks
and o⁄ers an explanation for the empirical relationship between in￿ ation and social unrest in
developing countries.
Keywords: Liquidity Preference, Money Demand, Incomplete Markets, Velocity, Welfare
Costs of In￿ ation.
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11 Introduction
In developing countries, liquid money (cash and checking accounts) is the major form of household
￿nancial wealth and a vital tool of self-insurance to bu⁄er idiosyncratic shocks because of the lack
of a well-developed ￿nancial system. Based on recent data in China and India, more than 90%
of the household ￿nancial wealth is held in the form of cash and checking accounts.1 Even in
developed countries, because of borrowing constraints, money remains one of the most important
assets to provide liquidity to smooth consumption, especially for low-income households. In the
United States, money demand is highly heterogeneous: The Gini coe¢ cient of the distribution
of money across households is greater than 0:85. This degree of heterogeneity in money demand
closely resembles the distribution of ￿nancial wealth instead of consumption (with a Gini coe¢ cient
less than 0:3). This suggests that the liquidity motive of money demand is at least as important
(if not more so) as the transaction motive of money demand, even in developed countries like the
United States.2
When money is essential for consumption smoothing and is unequally distributed across house-
holds, largely because of idiosyncratic needs for liquidity and lack of sophisticated risk sharing,
in￿ ation can be far more costly than recognized by the existing literature. Historical evidence also
suggests that moderate in￿ ation (around 10% to 20% a year) may be signi￿cant enough to cause
widespread social and political unrest in developing countries.3 Yet, the existing monetary liter-
ature suggests that the cost of in￿ ation is surprisingly small. For example, Lucas (2000) recently
estimated that the welfare cost of increasing in￿ ation from 4% to 14% is less than 1% of aggre-
gate output.4 Such results are disturbing; for if this is true, then the commonly accepted in￿ ation
target of 2% a year by most central banks in developed countries may be too conservative and
not well justi￿ed, and this policy may have forgone too large social bene￿ts of potentially higher
employment through faster money growth.
1Townsend (1995) points out that currency and crop inventory are the major forms of liquid assets to provide
self-insurance against idiosyncratic shocks for farmers in India and Thailand, and surprisingly, purchases and sales of
real capital assets, including livestock and consumer durables, do not play a role in smoothing income ￿ uctuations.
2Ragot (2009) reports that this stylized fact holds for other developed countries and argues that this is a problem
for theories that directly link money demand to consumption, such as cash-in-advance (CIA), money-in-the-utility
(MIU), or shopping-time models, but consistent with incomplete-market models in which money is held as a form of
￿nancial asset that provides liquidity to smooth consumption.
3See Cartwright, Delorme, and Wood (1985) and Looney (1985) for empirical studies on the relationship between
in￿ ation and revolutions in recent world history. Using data from 54 developing countries, Cartwright, Delorme, and
Wood (1985) ￿nd that in￿ ation is the most signi￿cant economic variable to explain the probability and duration of
social unrest and revolution, and is far more important than other economic variables, such as income inequality, GDP
per capita, income growth, unemployment rate, and degree of urbanization. Their estimates show that a one-unit
increase in the in￿ ation rate raises the probability of revolution by 6 percentage points and increases the duration of
revolution by 0:7 to 1:0 years.
4Similar estimates are also obtained by many others, such as Cooley and Hansen (1989), Dotsey and Ireland
(1996), Lagos and Wright (2005), and Henriksen and Kydland (2010) in di⁄erent models.
2To properly assess the welfare costs of in￿ ation, it is desirable that a theoretical model takes
the liquidity function of money and the precautionary motives of money demand into account and
matches at least two styled facts: (i) the interest elasticity of money demand (as suggested by
Bailey, 1956),5 and (ii) the cross-household distribution of money holdings. The ￿rst criterion
allows the model to capture the opportunity cost of holding non-interest￿ bearing cash, whereas
the second ensures that it captures the idiosyncratic liquidity risk or the heterogeneous "adverse
liquidity e⁄ects" of in￿ ation on the population.6
This paper constructs such a model by generalizing Bewley￿ s (1980, 1983) precautionary money
demand model to a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium framework.7 The key feature distin-
guishing Bewley￿ s model from the related literature, such as the cash-in-advance (CIA) model of
Lucas (1980) and the (S,s) inventory-theoretic model of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), is that
money is held solely as a store of value, completely symmetric to any other asset, and is not imposed
from outside as the means of payments. Agents can choose whether to hold money depending on
the costs and bene￿ts.8 By freeing money from its role of medium of exchange, Bewley￿ s approach
allows us to focus on the function of money as a pure form of liquidity, so that the welfare implica-
tions of the liquidity-preference theory of money demand can be investigated in isolation. Beyond
Bewley (1980, 1983), my generalized model is analytically tractable; hence, it greatly simpli￿es the
computation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium in environments with capital accumulation
and nontrivial distributions of cash balances, thus facilitating welfare and business-cycle analysis.
Analytical tractability makes the mechanisms of the model transparent.
The major ￿ndings of the paper include the following: (i) In sharp contrast to standard monetary
models, the generalized Bewley model is able to produce enough variability in velocity relative to
output to match the data; in particular, it can explain the negative correlation of velocity with real
balances in the short run and its positive correlation with in￿ ation in the long run. (ii) Transitory
lump-sum money injections can have positive real e⁄ects on aggregate activities despite ￿ exible
prices. (iii) Persistent money growth is very costly: When the model is calibrated to match not
only the interest elasticity of aggregate money demand but also the cross-household distribution of
money holdings in the data, the implied welfare cost of moderate in￿ ation is astonishingly large,
5Bailey (1956) ￿rst showed that the welfare cost of in￿ ation arising from the ine¢ ciencies of carrying out trans-
actions with means of payment that do not pay interest can be measured by the integral under the demand for
money.
6An "adverse liquidity e⁄ect" of in￿ ation refers to the e⁄ect on consumption from the loss of the liquidity value
of money due to in￿ ation, which destroys the self-insurance function of money and subjects people to idiosyncratic
shocks.
7General-equilibrium analysis is important. Cooley and Hansen (1989) emphasize the general-equilibrium e⁄ect
of in￿ ation on output through substituting leisure for consumption in the face of a positive in￿ ation, which causes
labor supply and output to decline. However, because these authors assume that money is held only for transaction
purpose, the welfare cost of in￿ ation is still small despite the general-equilibrium e⁄ects of in￿ ation on output, about
0:4% of GDP with 10% in￿ ation.
8In contrast, in the models of Lucas (1980), Baumol (1952), and Tobin (1956), money is held both as a store of
value (for precautionary reasons) and as a medium of exchange (for transaction purposes).
3at least 8% of consumption under 10% annual in￿ ation.
Since holding money is both bene￿cial (providing liquidity) and costly (forgoing interest pay-
ment), agents opt to hold di⁄erent amounts of cash depending on income levels and consumption
needs. As a result, a key property of the model is an endogenously determined distribution of money
holdings across households, with a strictly positive fraction of households being cash-constrained.
Hence, lump-sum money injections have an immediate positive impact on consumption for liquidity-
constrained agents, but not for agents with idle cash balances. Consequently, aggregate price
does not increase with aggregate money supply one-for-one, so transitory monetary shocks are ex-
pansionary to aggregate output (even without open market operations), the velocity of money is
countercyclical, and the aggregate price appears "sticky."
However, with anticipated in￿ ation, permanent money growth reduces welfare signi￿cantly for
several reasons: (i) Precautionary money demand induces agents to hold excessive amount of cash
to avoid liquidity constraints, raising the in￿ ation tax on the population. (ii) Liquidity-constrained
agents su⁄er disproportionately more from in￿ ation tax because they are subject to idiosyncratic
risks without self-insurance; thus, for the same reduction in real wealth, in￿ ation reduces their
expected utility more than it does for liquidity-rich agents. (iii) The size of the liquidity-constrained
population rises rapidly with in￿ ation, leading to an increased portion of the population unable to
smooth consumption against idiosyncratic shocks. This factor can dramatically raise social welfare
costs along the extensive margin. (iv) Agents opt to switch from "cash" goods (consumption)
to "credit" goods (leisure), thereby reducing labor supply and aggregate output.9 These e⁄ects
interact and compound each other, leading to large welfare losses.
The Bailey triangle is a poor measure of the welfare costs of in￿ ation because it fails to capture
the insurance function of money (as noted by Imrohoroglu, 1992). At a higher in￿ ation rate,
not only does the opportunity cost of holding money increase (which is the Bailey triangle), but
the crucial bene￿t of holding money also diminishes. In particular, when demand for money
declines, the portion of the liquidity-constrained population rises; consequently, the welfare cost
of in￿ ation increases sharply due to the loss of self-insurance for an increasingly larger proportion
of the population.10 This result is reminiscent of the analysis in Aiyagari (1994) where he shows
that the welfare cost of the loss of self-insurance in an incomplete-market economy is equivalent to
a 14% reduction in consumption even though his calibrated model matches only one third of the
income and wealth inequalities in the data.
This paper is also related to the work of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008). Both papers
are based on an inventory-theoretic approach with heterogeneous money demand and can explain
9Money facilitates consumption by providing liquidity, but consuming leisure does not require liquidity.
10This important extensive margin is not fully captured by Imrohoroglu (1992).
4the short-run dynamic behavior of velocity and sticky aggregate prices under transitory monetary
shocks. However, my approach di⁄ers from theirs in several aspects. First, their model is based
on the Baumol-Tobin inventory-theoretic framework where money is not only a store of value but
also a means of payment (similar to CIA models).11 Second, the distribution of money holdings
is exogenously given in their model; hence, the portion of population with the need for cash with-
drawals is ￿xed and cannot respond to monetary policy.12 Third, because agents are exogenously
and periodically segregated from the banking system and the CIA constraint always binds, the
expansionary real e⁄ects of monetary shocks cannot be achieved through lump-sum money injec-
tions in their model. For these reasons, the implications of the welfare costs of in￿ ation in their
model may also be very di⁄erent from those in this paper. For example, Attanasio, Guiso, and
Jappelli (2002) estimate the welfare costs of in￿ ation based on a simple Baumol-Tobin model and
￿nd the cost to be less than 0:1% of consumption under 10% in￿ ation. The main reason is that
this segment of the literature has relied exclusively on Bailey￿ s triangle (or the interest elasticity
of money demand) to measure the welfare costs of in￿ ation. Hence, despite having heterogeneous
money holdings across households, such research is not able to obtain signi￿cantly larger estimates
of the cost of in￿ ation than those in representative-agent models.
Bewley￿ s (1980) model has been studied in the recent literature, but the main body of this
literature focuses on an endowment economy. For example, Imrohoroglu (1992) and Akyol (2004)
study the welfare costs of in￿ ation in the Bewley model. To the best of my knowledge, Imrohoroglu
(1992) may be the ￿rst one to recognize that the welfare costs of in￿ ation in a Bewley economy are
larger than that suggested by the Bailey triangle. However, like Bewley (1980), this segment of the
literature is based on an endowment economy without production and capital and these models
are not analytically tractable. In addition, Imrohoroglu and Akyol do not calibrate their models to
match the actual distribution of money holdings in the data. To facilitate numerical computations,
such models typically assume that the portion of the liquidity-constrained population is exoge-
nously given rather than endogenously determined (e.g., by assuming a binary-point distribution
of idiosyncratic shocks). Consequently, the distribution of money demand does not shift in reac-
tion to monetary policies, strongly dampening the adverse liquidity e⁄ects of in￿ ation on welfare
along the extensive margin.13 Ragot (2009), on the other hand, uses a general-equilibrium ver-
sion of Bewley￿ s model with segregated markets (similar to Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond, 2008)
to explain the joint distribution of money demand, consumption, and ￿nancial assets. He shows
11For the more recent literature based on the Baumol-Tobin model, see Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), Bai
(2005), Chiu (2007), and Khan and Thomas (2007), among others.
12Chiu (2007) and Khan and Thomas (2007) relaxed this assumption by having an endogenously determined number
of trips for cash withdraws.
13This literature tends to ￿nd higher welfare costs of in￿ ation, but the absolute magnitude is still small. For
example, Imrohoroglu (1992) shows the welfare cost of 10% in￿ ation is slightly above 1% of consumption.
5that standard models in which money serves only as a medium of exchange are inconsistent with
the empirical distributions of these variables, whereas a general-equilibrium version of the Bewley
model in which money is held as a store of value can better explain the empirical distributions.
Nonetheless, Ragot (2009) also uses a numerical approach to solve the model and he does not study
the welfare implications of in￿ ation.
Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford (1992) study the welfare e⁄ects of in￿ ation in a Bewley model with
aggregate uncertainty. They show that lump-sum nominal transfers can redistribute wealth from
cash-rich agents to cash-poor agents, because the latter receive disproportionately more transfers
than the former and thereby bene￿t from in￿ ation. Consequently, in￿ ation may improve social
welfare. However, this positive e⁄ect on social welfare is quite small and requires extreme parameter
values in their model, and such an e⁄ect exists in my model if money injection is purely transitory
(i.e., without changing the steady-state stock of money). The Friedman rule is Pareto optimal in
my model with anticipated in￿ ation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the benchmark model on
the household side and shows how to solve for individuals￿decision rules of money demand and
consumption analytically. It reveals some of the basic properties of a monetary model based on
liquidity preference. Section 3 uses the model to match the empirical distributions of wealth, money
demand, and consumption across U.S. households and the interest elasticity of aggregate money
demand over time. Section 4 closes the model with ￿rms and studies the impulse responses of
the model to transitory monetary shocks in general equilibrium. Section 5 discusses calibrations




The model is a stochastic general-equilibrium version of the model of Bewley (1980, 1983).14 This
section studies a partial-equilibrium version of the model without ￿rms. To highlight the liquid-
ity value of money, the model features money as the only asset that can be adjusted quickly and
costlessly to bu⁄er idiosyncratic shocks from income or wealth at any moment. Interest-bearing
nonmonetary assets (such as capital) can be accumulated to support consumption, but are not as
useful (or liquid) as money in bu⁄ering idiosyncratic shocks. This setup captures the character-
istics of the lack of well-developed ￿nancial markets and risk-sharing arrangements in developing
countries.
14In contrast to Bewley (1980, 1983), money does not earn interest in my model; hence the insatiability problem
discussed by Bewley does not arise. Consequently, a monetary equilibrium always exists under the Friedman rule as
long as the support of the distribution of shocks is bounded.
6I make the model analytically tractable by introducing two important features: (i) I allow
endogenous labor supply with quasi-linear preferences (as in Lagos and Wright, 2005), and (ii) I
replace idiosyncratic labor income shocks typically assumed in the literature (e.g., Imrohoroglu,
1989, 1992; Aiyagari, 1994; Huggett, 1993, 1997) by other types of shocks. Even with quasi-
linear preferences, the model is not analytically tractable if labor income is directly subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. There are two ways to overcome this di¢ culty. One is to place idiosyncratic
shocks in preferences (i.e., to the marginal utility of consumption as in Lucas, 1980), and the other
is to place them on net wealth. This paper takes the second approach.15 Both alternatives yield
similar results for the questions addressed in this paper. This is reassuring because it suggests
that the source of uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks does not matter for my results. Having the
idiosyncratic uncertainty originating from preferences or household wealth provides an additional
advantage, which enables the model to match the distribution of money demand and consumption
in the data more easily than labor-income shocks. As shown by Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and
Smith (1998), idiosyncratic labor income shocks are not able to generate a su¢ cient degree of
inequality to match the data, especially when such shocks are transitory. Preference or wealth
shocks can do a better job in this regard because by assumption they are not fully self-insurable
even when such shocks are i:i:d.
Time is discrete. There is a continuum of households indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Each household
is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, ￿t(i), to its net wealth. ￿t(i) has the distribution F(￿) ￿




. A household chooses consumption ct(i), labor supply nt(i), a
nonmonetary asset st(i) that pays the real rate of return rt > 0, and nominal balance mt(i) to
maximize lifetime utilities, taking as given the aggregate real wage (wt), the market real interest
rate (rt), the aggregate price (Pt), and the nominal lump-sum transfers (￿t). Although money is
dominated in the expected rate of return by nonmonetary assets, it is more liquid than other assets
(such as capital) as a store of value (￿ the de￿nition of liquidity to be speci￿ed below). Hence,
by providing liquidity to facilitate consumption demand, money can coexist with interest-bearing
assets.
To capture the liquidity role of money, assume that the decisions for labor supply (nt(i)) and
holdings for interest-bearing assets (st(i)) in each period t must be made before observing the
idiosyncratic shock ￿t(i) in that period, and the decisions, once made, cannot be changed for the
rest of the period (i.e., these markets are closed for households afterward until the beginning of
the next period). Thus, if there is an urge to consume or an unexpected change in wealth during
period t after labor supply and investment decisions are made, money stock is the only asset that
15See the earlier version of this paper, Wen (2009a), for analysis under the ￿rst approach.
7can be adjusted to smooth consumption.16 Borrowing of liquidity (money) from other households
is not allowed (i.e., m(i) ￿ 0).17 These assumptions imply that households may ￿nd it optimal to
carry money as inventories (self-insurance device) to cope with income uncertainty (as in Bewley,
1980); even though money is not required as a medium of exchange, it can be used to exchange
for consumption goods. As in the standard literature, any aggregate uncertainty is resolved at
the beginning of each period before any decisions are made and is orthogonal to idiosyncratic
uncertainty.
An alternative way of formulating the above information structure for decision-making is to
divide each period into two subperiods, with labor supply and nonmonetary-asset investment de-
termined in the ￿rst subperiod, the rest of the variables (consumption and money holdings) deter-
mined in the second subperiod, and the idiosyncratic shocks ￿t(i) realized only in the beginning of
the second subperiod. Yet another alternative speci￿cation of the model is to have two islands, with
nt(i) and st(i) determined in island 1 and ct(i) and mt(i) determined in island 2 simultaneously by
two spatially separated household members (e.g., a worker and a shopper), but only the shopper
￿ who determines consumption and money balances in island 2 ￿ can observe ￿t(i) in period t.
Both members can observe aggregate shocks and the history of decisions up to period t. At the
end of each period the two members reunite and share everything perfectly (e.g., income, wealth,
and information) and separate again in the beginning of the next period.
These information structures amount to creating a necessary friction for the existence of money
and capturing the feature that labor income and nonmonetary assets are not as useful as money to
respond to the random liquidity needs of households. In reality, especially in developing countries,
it is costly to exchange labor and real assets for consumption goods in spot markets (e.g., due to
search frictions). Even in developed countries, government bonds are rarely held as a major form
of liquid assets by low-income households.










￿t [logct(i) ￿ ant(i)]
))
(1)
16This timing friction is what we need to generate a positive liquidity value of money over other assets in equilibrium.
This type of timing friction is also assumed by Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) and Akyol (2004) in endowment
economies with random income shocks. It is also akin to the transaction costs approach of Aiyagari and Gertler
(1991), Chatterjee and Corbae (1992), Greenwood and Williamson (1989), and Ragot (2009).
17See Wen (2009a) for an extension of the model to allowing for borrowing and lending through ￿nancial interme-
diation.
18The consumption utility function can be more general without losing analytical tractability. For example, the
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+ wtnt(i) + (1 + rt)st￿1(i) ￿ st(i) (4)
de￿nes the net wealth of the household, which includes last-period real balances, labor income and
capital gains, and subtracts net investment in interest-bearing assets. The expectation operator ~ Et
denotes expectation conditional on the information set of the ￿rst subperiod in period t (which ex-
cludes ￿t(i)), and the operator Et denotes expectation based on information of the second subperiod
(which includes ￿t(i)). Without loss of generality, assume a = 1.19
Note that the net wealth on the right-hand side of equation (2) has a multiplier "+￿t(i), where
" 2 (0;1) is a constant, and ￿t(i) is an idiosyncratic shock to net wealth. This implies that an "
fraction of the net wealth is never subject to idiosyncratic shocks. This parameter is important
for allowing the model to match the joint distribution of money demand and consumption in the
data. The expected value (mean) of ￿(i) is normalized to E￿(i) = 1 ￿ ", so that the average value
of the multiplier ￿ +"(i) equals 1, which implies that idiosyncratic shocks do not cause distortions
to the resource constraint on average or at the aggregate level. The idiosyncratic wealth shock
￿t(i) is similar to an idiosyncratic tax shock and it implies that nature redistributes a portion of
the net wealth randomly across households. This shock is also important for allowing the model to
match the joint distributions of money demand and consumption in the data. This shock gives rise
to incentives for households to hold money as an self-insurance device.20 Unlike transitory labor
income shocks, wealth shocks are only partially insurable through savings even though the shocks
are i:i:d. This allows the model to match the empirical inequalities of money demand easily.
Since money is not required as a medium of exchange, choosing mt(i) = 0 for all t is always an
equilibrium. In what follows, we focus on monetary equilibria where money is accepted as a store of
value. Denoting f￿(i);v(i)g as the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (2) and (3), respectively,
19To make money completely symmetric to interest-bearing assets, we can also impose borrowing constraints on
non-monetary assets. However, as long as the real rate of return to such assets exceeds one (￿ which is the case when
rt is endogenous), borrowing constraints do not bind for these assets in the steady state. Hence, such constraints are
ignored in this paper.
20The multiplicative assumption of individual wealth shocks implies that the degree of inequality in wealth dis-
tribution does not shrink but remains stable as the economy grows. This implication is consistent with empirical
evidence (see, e.g., Wol⁄, 1998). The sensitivity of the results to this assumption is analyzed in Wen (2009a), where
I show that the results remain robust when the idiosyncractic shocks are from preferences instead of wealth.
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where equations (6) and (7) re￿ ect that decisions for labor supply nt(i) and asset investment st(i)
must be made before the idiosyncratic wealth shocks (and hence the value of ￿t(i)) are realized. Us-
ing equation (6), by the law of iterated expectations and the orthogonality assumption of aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks, equations (7) and (8) can be rewritten, respectively, as
1
wt











w pertains to the expected marginal utility of consumption in terms of labor.
Note that equation (9) is the standard Euler equation for asset accumulation and it implies 1 =
￿(1 + r) in the absence of aggregate uncertainty (i.e., in the steady state). Thus, idiosyncratic
shocks have no e⁄ects on the decisions of nonmonetary asset demand in the model, which simpli￿es
the analysis.
The decision rules for an individual￿ s consumption and money demand are characterized by a
cuto⁄ strategy, taking as given the aggregate environment. Assuming interior solutions for labor
supply and nonmonetary asset holdings and in anticipation that the cuto⁄, ￿￿
t, is independent of i,
we consider two possible cases below.
Case A. ￿t(i) ￿ ￿￿
t. In this case, the net wealth level is high. It is hence optimal to hold
money as inventories to prevent possible liquidity constraints in the future. So mt(i) ￿ 0, vt(i) = 0,
and the shadow value of good ￿t(i) = ￿Et
Pt
wt+1Pt+1. Equation (5) implies that consumption is






. The budget identity (2) then implies
mt(i)






. The requirement mt(i) ￿ 0 then implies
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t; (11)
10which de￿nes the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t.
Case B. ￿t(i) < ￿￿
t. In this case, the net wealth level is low. It is then optimal to spend all
money in hand to smooth consumption, so vt(i) > 0 and mt(i) = 0. By the resource constraint




















￿(i) < ￿￿, equation (10) con￿rms that vt(i) > 0, provided that Pt < 1. Notice that the shadow
value of goods, ￿(i), is higher under case B than under case A because of a tighter budget constraint
under case B.
The above analyses imply that the expected shadow value of goods, ~ Et f[" + ￿t(i)]￿t(i)g, and
hence the optimal cuto⁄ value, ￿￿
t, is determined by the following asset-pricing equation for money

























measures the (shadow) rate of return to money (or the liquidity premium). The LHS of equation
(12) is the opportunity cost of holding one unit of real balances as inventory (as opposed to holding
one more unit of real asset). The RHS is the expected gains by holding money, which take two
possible values: The second term on the RHS is simply the discounted next-period utility cost of
inventory (￿Et
"+￿t(i)
Pt+1wt+1) in the case of high income (￿(i) ￿ ￿￿), which has probability
R
￿(i)￿￿￿ dF(￿).





Pt+1wt+1) in the case
of low income (￿(i) < ￿￿), which has probability
R
￿(i)<￿￿ dF(￿). The optimal cuto⁄ ￿￿ is chosen so
that the marginal cost equals the expected marginal gains. Hence, the rate of return to investing
in money (or the liquidity premium) is determined by R(￿￿).
Notice that R(￿￿
t) > 1 (recall E￿(i) = 1 ￿ "), which implies that the option value of one dollar
exceeds 1 because it provides liquidity in the case of a low income shock. This is why money has
positive value in equilibrium despite the fact that its real rate of return is negative and dominated
by interest-bearing assets. The optimal level of cash reserve (money demand) is always such that
the probability of stockout (i.e., being liquidity constrained) is strictly positive (i.e., F(￿￿
t) > 0)
unless the cost of holding money is zero. This inventory-theoretic formula of the rate of return
to liquidity is akin to that derived by Wen (2008) in an inventory model based on the stockout-
11avoidance motive. Also note that aggregate shocks will a⁄ect the distribution of money holdings
across households by a⁄ecting the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t.
Most importantly, equation (12) implies that the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t is independent of i. This property
facilitates aggregation and makes the model analytically tractable. Consequently, numerical solu-
tion methods (such as the method of Krusell and Smith, 1998) are not needed to solve the model￿ s
general equilibrium and aggregate dynamics.








, which is also inde-
pendent of i. Hence, hereafter we drop the index i from xt.21 The intuition for xt being independent
of i is that (i) xt is determined before the realization of ￿t(i) and all households face the same dis-
tribution of idiosyncratic shocks when making labor supply and capital accumulation decisions,
and (ii) the quasi-linear preference structure implies that labor supply can be adjusted elastically
to meet any target level of wealth xt in anticipation of the possible wealth shocks. Hence, in the
beginning of every period agents opt to adjust labor supply so that the target wealth and proba-
bility of liquidity constraint in this period are the same across all states of nature, with the target
wealth depending only on aggregate states of the economy. This property makes xt and the cuto⁄
￿￿
t independent of individual history.
Since the Euler equation for interest-bearing assets is given by 1
wt = ￿Et(1+rt+1) 1
wt+1, ignoring
the covariance terms and comparing with equation (12), we have R(￿￿
t) =
Pt+1
Pt (1 + rt+1). This
suggests that the equilibrium rate of return to money is positively related to the Fisherian form
of nominal interest rate on nonmonetary assets. This asset-pricing implication for the value of
money is similar to that discussed by Svensson (1985) in a model with an occasional binding CIA
constraint.
































, which is less than 1 in
the case of a low wealth shock (￿(i) < ￿￿). These decision rules indicate that consumption is lower
21However, the e⁄ective wealth level depends on i because it is given by [" + ￿t(i)]xt.





Hence, if in￿ ation reduces real wealth xt (holding ￿￿
t constant), then both cash-rich and cash-
poor agents are worse o⁄ in terms of consumption level, since average consumption is lower for
all agents. However, since the variance of ￿(i) remains the same, a lower real wealth implies that
liquidity-constrained agents su⁄er disproportionately more from in￿ ation than do cash-rich agents
in terms of welfare (because idiosyncratic shocks a⁄ect only cash-poor agents). More importantly,
if in￿ ation increases the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t (holding xt constant), then the probability of facing a binding
liquidity constraint rises, leading to a larger proportion of the population without self-insurance,
thereby reducing social welfare signi￿cantly along the extensive margin. This last channel is com-
pletely missing in the existing literature.
2.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis








(n(i)di, and X =
R
x(i)di, and integrating the household decision rules over i by the law of large numbers, the





























and these two functions satisfy D(￿￿) + H(￿￿) = 1 and D(￿￿) + R(￿￿) = 1 + " + ￿￿. Thus,
D(￿￿
t) 2 (0;1) is the aggregate marginal propensity to consume from the target wealth, and H(￿￿
t)
is the marginal propensity to hold money. Because the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t is time varying, these marginal
propensities are also time varying and depend on monetary policies.
Monetary Policy. We consider two types (regimes) of monetary policies. In the short-run
dynamic analysis, money supply shocks are completely transitory without a⁄ecting the steady-state
stock of money; namely, the lump-sum transfers follow the law of motion
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 + ￿ M"t; (22)
13Mt = ￿ M + ￿t; (23)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ M is the steady-state money supply. This policy implies the percentage
deviation of money stock follows an AR(1) process, Mt￿ ￿ M
￿ M = ￿
Mt￿1￿ ￿ M
￿ M + "t. Under this policy
regime, the steady-state in￿ ation rate is zero, ￿ = 0.22
In the long-run (steady-state) analysis, money supply has a permanent growth component with,
￿t = ￿ ￿Mt￿1 (24)
where ￿ ￿ is a constant growth rate of money supply.
The Quantity Theory. The aggregate relationship between consumption (equation 17) and
money demand (equation 18) implies the "quantity" equation,





t) measures the aggregate consumption velocity of money.23 A high velocity implies











, which has no ￿nite upper bound, in sharp contrast to CIA models where
velocity is typically bounded above by 1. An in￿nite velocity means that either the value of money
( 1
P ) is zero or nominal money demand (M) is zero.
Steady-State Analysis. A steady state is de￿ned as the situation without aggregate uncer-
tainty. Hence, in a steady state all real variables are constant over time. The steady-state cuto⁄







Pt￿1 is the steady-state rate of in￿ ation. Hence, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ is constant for a given
level of in￿ ation. The quantity relation (25) implies Pt
Pt￿1 = Mt
Mt￿1 = ￿ ￿ in the steady state, so the
steady-state in￿ ation rate is the same as the growth rate of money.
Since by equation (26) the return to liquidity R must increase with ￿, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ must
also increase with ￿ (because
@R(￿￿)
@￿￿ = F(￿￿) > 0). This means that when in￿ ation rises, the
required rate of return to liquidity must also increase accordingly to induce people to hold money.
22This monetary policy is similar to the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank￿ s "Quantitative Easing" programs that inject
liquidity into the economy during ￿nancial crisis but withdraw completely the injected money out of the economy
slowly afterwards. Hence, the long-run stock of money is not a⁄ected under this type of policies.
23Alternatively, we can also measure the velocity of money by aggregate income, PY = M ~ V , where ~ V ￿ V
Y
C is
the income velocity of money.
14However, because the cost of holding money increases with ￿, agents opt to hold less money so
that the probability of stockout (F(￿￿)) rises, which reinforces a rise in the equilibrium shadow
rate of return (i.e., the liquidity premium), so that @2R
@(￿￿)2 > 0. By de￿nitions (20) and (21), we
have @D
@￿￿ = 1 ￿ F(￿￿) > 0 and @H
@￿￿ = F(￿￿) ￿ 1 < 0. Also, since the target wealth is given by
x(￿￿) = w
R(￿￿)







["+￿￿]2 < 0, so the target wealth decreases
with ￿. Therefore, a higher rate of in￿ ation has two types of e⁄ects on welfare: the intensive
margin and the extensive margin. On the intensive margin, @x
@￿ < 0, so lower wealth leads to lower
consumption for all agents. In addition, liquidity-constrained agents su⁄er disproportionately more
because they do not have self-insurance yet face the same variance of idiosyncratic shocks (￿2
￿)
while having a lower wealth level. This second aspect of the intensive margin is emphasized by
Imrohoroglu (1992) and Akyol (2004). On the extensive margin, @￿￿
@￿ > 0, thus a larger portion
of the population will become liquidity constrained and subject to idiosyncratic shocks. This
extensive margin will be shown to be an important force to a⁄ect social welfare but has not been
fully appreciated by the existing literature.
Under the Friedman rule, 1 + ￿ = ￿, we must have R = 1 and ￿￿ = 0 according to equation
(13), and consequently, D(￿￿) = " and H(￿￿) = 1￿" according to equations (20) and (21). Hence,
the demand for money does not become in￿nity under the Friedman rule. This is in contrast to
(but consistent with) Bewley￿ s (1983) analysis because money does not earn interest in my model.
Hence, a monetary equilibrium with positive prices always exists under the Friedman rule in my
model. In this case, we have c(i) = w for all i ￿ that is, consumption is perfectly smoothed across
all states under the Friedman rule.
However, since ￿￿ is bounded above by ￿ ￿, there must exist a maximum rate of in￿ ation ￿max
under which the highest liquidity premium is given by R(￿ ￿) = " + ￿ ￿ = 1+￿max
￿ . At this maximum
in￿ ation rate ￿max = ￿
￿
" + ￿ ￿
￿
￿ 1, we have D(￿ ￿) = 1 and H(￿ ￿) = 0. That is, the optimal demand
for real balances becomes zero: M
P = 0. When the cost of holding money is so high, agents opt
not to use money as the store of value and the velocity becomes in￿nity: V = D
H = 1. The
steady-state velocity is an increasing function of in￿ ation because money demand drops faster than
consumption as the in￿ ation tax rises: @V
@￿￿ =
(1￿F)
H2 > 0. This long-run implication is consistent
with empirical data. For example, Chiu (2007) has found using cross-country data that countries
with higher average in￿ ation also tend to have signi￿cantly higher levels of velocity and argued
that such an implication cannot be deduced from the Baumol-Tobin model with an exogenously
segmented asset market.24
24Also see the empirical analysis in Lucas (2000).
15Notice that positive consumption can always be supported in equilibrium without the use of
money: No agents will hold money if they anticipate others do not. For example, consider the
situation where the value of money is zero, 1
P = 0. In this case, equation (12) is still valid with
both sides of the equation equal zero, thus equation (26) is no longer necessary. Equation (18)
implies that H(￿￿) = 0 and ￿￿ = ￿ ￿, so that money demand is always zero for all households.
Equation (17) implies that consumption is strictly positive because D(￿ ￿) = 1 > 0. Hence, as in
the overlapping-generations model of Samuelson (1958), this model permits multiple equilibria: a
monetary equilibrium when the in￿ ation rate is su¢ ciently low and a nonmonetary equilibrium
regardless of the in￿ ation rate.
When money is no longer held as a store of value because of su¢ ciently high in￿ ation (￿ ￿ ￿max),
we have c(i) = [" + ￿(i)]w, so consumption is completely uninsured and unsmoothed. However,
the average (or aggregate) consumption is still C = w, the same as that under the Friedman rule.
This suggests the potential danger of measuring the welfare cost of in￿ ation or the business cycle
based on aggregate variables.
3 Matching Money Demand
Figure 1. Distribution of Money Demand in the United States (1989-2007)
16Figure 1 plots the Lorenz curve of money demand by American households based on the Survey
of Consumer Finance for the years of 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007.25 Each survey
covers about 4000 households and is conducted every three years. The Lorenz curve shows the
portion of total aggregate money balances held by di⁄erent fractions of the population. The 45
degree line on the diagonal indicates complete equality. The ￿gure shows that the amount of
money held by households is highly unequally distributed, even though the top 1% of the richest
households have been excluded from the sample. The implied Gini coe¢ cients for these di⁄erent
years are, respectively, 0.81, 0.84, 0.83, 0.81, 0.83, 0.84, and 0.82, with an average of 0:82.26 The
degree of inequality is extremely large and has not declined over the past 20 years. For example,
in 2007, about 22% of the population holds essentially no money (less than or equal to $10 in their
checking accounts), 50% of the population holds less than 3% of the aggregate money balances,
and the richest 10% of the population holds more than 75% of the total liquid assets.
To capture these features of the distribution of money demand, we assume that the idiosyncratic
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, where " 2 [0;1] is the wealth multiplier in equation (2).














￿ , which determines the upper bound ￿ ￿ of the distribution. This distribution
includes the Uniform distribution as a special case when ￿ = 1, in which case we have ￿ ￿ = 2(1 ￿ ")
and F(￿) = ￿





with ￿ ￿ = 1+￿
￿ . On the
other hand, when " = 1, the distribution degenerates to the Dirac delta function with entire mass
at ￿ = 0, regardless the value of ￿.27 In this case, the model reduces to a representative-agent
model without idiosyncratic risks where the equilibrium value of money is 1
P = 0, and wealth is
equally distributed across agents with Gini coe¢ cient equal to 0. Hence, the distribution is quite
general and it covers a variety of interesting cases by changing the parameter values of f￿;"g.
With the generalized power distribution function, we have
R(￿￿) = (￿￿ + ")
(￿￿ + ")
￿ ￿ "￿
￿￿ ￿ + "
￿￿ ￿ "￿ +
￿
1 + ￿
￿￿ ￿ + "
￿1+￿ ￿ (￿￿ + ")
1+￿
￿￿ ￿ + "
￿￿ ￿ "￿ (28)
25Money demand is de￿ned as cash and checking accounts, consistent with Ragot (2009).
26The average Gini coe¢ cient without excluding the top 1% richest individuals is 0:92.
27The Dirac delta function is a degenerate distribution that has the value zero everywhere except at ￿ = 0, where
its value is in￿nitely large in such a way that its total integral is 1.
17D(￿￿) = 1 + " + ￿￿ ￿ R(￿￿) (29)
H (￿￿) = 1 ￿ D(￿￿): (30)
The cuto⁄ can be solved using the relation R(￿￿) = 1+￿
￿ . The solution is unique because R(￿￿) is






@￿￿ = F(￿￿) > 0. The Lorenz curves in the model can be
computed as follows. At any level of wealth ￿, the cumulative population density is F(￿), and the
cumulative densities for wealth (Fw), money balances (Fm), and consumption (Fc) as a fraction of
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if ￿ ￿ ￿￿
: (33)
Notice that these distributions must satisfy the relation, D(￿￿)Fc + H (￿￿)Fm = E (" + ￿)Fw.
Suppose we set the time period to one year, ￿ = 0:96, the annual in￿ ation rate ￿ = 2%,
and calibrate the parameters f￿;"g in the power distribution function such that the implied Gini
coe¢ cient of the distribution of money demand in the model is 0:8. These values are consistent
with ￿ = 0:01 and " = 0:0015.28 Under these parameter values, the implied Gini coe¢ cient for the
distribution of net wealth, [" + ￿(i)]x, is 0:76 and that for consumption is 0:39 in the model.29 The
consumption Gini for the United States is around 0:3, smaller than predicted by the model. This
28There is no problem for the model to generate a higher Gini (say, above 0:9) by reducing the values of f￿;"g
further.
29Since the nonmonetary wealth s(i) can only be determined explicitly at the aggregate level in the model, it is
not possible to measure the distribution of gross household wealth,
m(i)
P + (1 + r)s(i). This is why we report only
the distribution of net wealth in the paper.
18may be because households in the United States have other means to smooth consumption besides
holding money.30 However, these predictions are qualitatively consistent with the U.S. data ￿ the
distribution of money demand is far closer to that of wealth than to consumption. This is the
consequence of holding money as an asset instead of a means of payment, so money serves mainly
as a bu⁄er stock to smooth consumption against wealth (income) shocks. The better money can
serve as a store of value to smooth consumption, the closer is the distribution of money demand to
that of wealth than to consumption. The predicted Lorenz curves are graphed in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Predicted Distributions of Consumption, Money Demand, and Wealth
Figure 2 indicates that the liquidity-constrained (cash-poor) agents are less able to smooth
consumption, so the consumption curve and the wealth curve are close to each other toward the
left of the ￿gure, whereas the cash-rich agents are better able to smooth consumption using money,
so the consumption curve and wealth curve lie far apart toward the right of the ￿gure. Hence, the
Lorenz curve for consumption is not symmetric. In particular, the consumption level is constant
across agents for the richest 45% of the population because they are not liquidity constrained;
therefore, the consumption Lorenz curve becomes increasingly like a straight line toward the right
side of the graph.
30Ragot (2009) reports that for the United States, the ￿nancial-wealth Gini is around 0:8, the money demand Gini
is around 0:83, and the consumption Gini is 0:28.
19The calibrated model is also able to rationalize the empirical "money demand" curve estimated
by Lucas (2000). Using historical data for GDP, money stock (M1), and the nominal interest
rate, Lucas (2000) showed that the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP is downward sloping against the
nominal interest rate. Lucas interpreted this downward relationship as a "money demand" curve
and argued that it can be rationalized by the Sidrauski (1967) model of MIU. Lucas estimated that




where A is a scale parameter, r the nominal interest rate, and ￿ the interest elasticity of money
demand. He showed that ￿ = 0:5 gives the best ￿t. Because the money demand de￿ned by Lucas
is identical to the inverted velocity, a downward-sloping money demand curve is the same as an
upward-sloping velocity curve (namely, velocity is positively related to nominal interest rate or
in￿ ation). Similar to Lucas, the money demand curve implied by the benchmark model of this







where A is a scale parameter, the functions fH;Dg are de￿ned by equations (21) and (20), and the
cuto⁄ ￿￿ is a function of the nominal interest rate implied by equation (26). Figure 3 shows a close
￿t of the theoretical model to the U.S. data.31
The model is able to match the empirical aggregate money demand curve because velocity in the
model is highly sensitive to in￿ ation, especially near the Friedman rule. When the parameters of
the model (especially " and ￿) are calibrated to match the empirical distribution of money demand,
the implied velocity of money is close to zero near the Friedman rule but increases rapidly toward
in￿nity as in￿ ation rises. This is the consequence of optimal behaviors of the households: When
the idiosyncratic risk is large (i.e., when both " and ￿ are small), households opt to hold excessive
amounts of liquidity as self-insurance against idiosyncratic shocks if the cost of doing so is small
(i.e., near the Friedman rule). However, large cash reserves also hurt the households when in￿ ation
rises; so they deplete cash holdings rapidly when anticipated in￿ ation increases, raising the portion
of the liquidity-constrained population signi￿cantly. As a result, aggregate money demand declines
and the velocity of money increases sharply. This also suggests that the marginal welfare cost of
31The circles in Figure 3 show plots of annual time series of a short-term nominal interest rate (the commercial
paper rate) against the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP, for the United States for the period 1892￿ 1997. The data
are from the online Historical Statistics of the United States￿ Millennium Edition. The solid line with crosses is the
model￿ s prediction calibrated at annual frequency with ￿ = 0:96 and ￿ = 0:1. The other parameters remain the same:
￿ = 0:3;" = 0:0015, and ￿ = 0:02. The nominal interest rate in the model is de￿ned as
1+￿
￿ . The scale parameter is
set to A = 0:04.
20in￿ ation may be extremely large near the Friedman rule because of the high in￿ ation elasticities of
money demand and velocity (to be shown below).
Figure 3. Aggregate Money Demand Curve in the Model (￿) and Data (o).
4 General-Equilibrium Analysis
The model of money demand outlined above can be easily embedded in a standard real business
cycle (RBC) model for general-equilibrium analysis, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989). As pointed
out by Cooley and Hansen (1989), a general-equilibrium analysis is essential for obtaining the
correct measures of the welfare costs of in￿ ation because it takes into account the trade-o⁄between
consumption and leisure under in￿ ation tax.
Assume that capital is the only nonmonetary asset and is accumulated according to Kt+1 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)Kt = It, where I is gross aggregate investment with ￿ the rate of capital depreciation;
the production technology is given by Yt = AtKt
￿N1￿￿
t , where At denotes TFP. Under perfect
competition and assuming that ￿rms can rent capital from a competitive rental market, factor
prices are determined by marginal products, rt + ￿ = ￿ Yt
Kt and wt = (1 ￿ ￿) Yt
Nt. The market
clearing conditions for the capital market, labor market, and money market are given, respectively,
by St = Kt+1,
R
nt(i) = Nt, and Mt = ￿ Mt = ￿ Mt￿1 +￿t, where ￿ Mt denotes aggregate money supply
21in period t. Notice that equations (17), (18), and (19) with money market clearing (M = M￿1+￿)
imply the aggregate goods-market clearing condition,
Ct + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt = Yt: (36)
A general equilibrium is de￿ned as the sequence fCt;Yt;Nt;Kt+1;Mt;Pt;wt;rt;￿￿
tg, such that all
households maximize utilities subject to their resource and borrowing constraints, ￿rms maximize
pro￿ts, all markets clear, the law of large numbers holds, and the set of standard transversality
conditions is satis￿ed.32 The equations needed to solve for the general equilibrium are (9), (12),
(17), (18), (36), the production function, ￿rms￿￿rst-order conditions with respect to fK;Ng, and
the law of motion for money, M = M￿1 + ￿. It is straightforward to con￿rm by the eigenvalue
method that the aggregate model has a unique saddle path near the steady state, which is unique.
Because the steady state is unique and the system is saddle stable, the distribution of money
demand converges to a unique time-invariant distribution in the long run. The aggregate dynamics
of the model can be solved by standard methods in the representative-agent RBC literature, such
as log-linearizing the aggregate model around the steady state and then applying the method of
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) to ￿nd the stationary equilibrium saddle path as in King, Plosser, and
Rebelo (1988). This is the method we will use in the following analysis.
4.1 Steady-State Allocation




Y = 1 ￿
￿￿￿
1￿￿(1￿￿), respectively, which are the same as in standard representative-
agent RBC models without money.33 Since r + ￿ = ￿ Y
K and w = (1 ￿ ￿)Y
N, the factor prices are
given by r = 1





1￿￿, respectively. Hence, the existence of money
in this model does not alter the steady-state saving rate, the great ratios, the utilization rate, the
real wage, and the real interest rate in the neoclassical growth model, in contrast to standard CIA
models. However, the levels of income, consumption, employment, the capital stock, and hence
welfare will be a⁄ected by money supply. These levels are given recursively by
C =
wR(￿￿)
" + ￿￿ D(￿￿); Y =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿
C; K =
￿￿






which are a⁄ected by monetary policy only through its in￿ uence on the distribution of money
demand via the cuto⁄ ￿￿(￿).
32Such transversality conditions include limt!1 ￿
t Kt+1
wt+1 = 0 and limt!1 ￿
t Mt
Pt+1 = 0, where
1
w is the shadow value
of capital and
1
P is the value of money.
33That is, the model achieves the modi￿ed golden rule.
224.2 Business Cycle Implications
For short-run business-cycle analysis, we follow the existing literature by calibrating the model to
quarterly frequency. We set ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 0:025, and ￿ = 0:3. We keep ￿ = 0:02 and " = 0:0015
in accordance with Figure 2. The impulse responses of velocity and the aggregate price to a 1%
transitory increase in the money stock under the ￿rst policy regime, Mt￿ ￿ M
￿ M = ￿
Mt￿1￿ ￿ M
￿ M +"t, where
￿ = 0:9, are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Impulse Responses to a 1% Money Injection.
Clearly, the velocity of money decreases nearly one-for-one with the money injection. The
aggregate price level is "sticky" ￿ it increases by less than 0:2 percent, far less than the 1 percent
increase of money stock (see the right-hand window in Figure 1). Such a "sluggish" response of
aggregate price to money is also noted by Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008) in a Baumol-
Tobin inventory-theoretic model of money demand. Thus, velocity and real money balance move
in the opposite directions at the business-cycle frequency. This negative relationship is a stylized
business-cycle fact documented by Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008).
Because only a portion of the population is liquidity constrained and only the constrained agents
will increase consumption when nominal income is higher, the aggregate price level will not rise
proportionately to the monetary increase. Also, since the money injection is transitory (i.e., the
aggregate money stock will return to its steady-state level in the long run), the expected in￿ ation
23rate, Et
Pt+1
Pt , falls and the real cost of holding money is lowered. This encourages all agents to
increase money demand to reduce the probability of borrowing constraint. Consequently, aggregate
real balances rise more than aggregate consumption and the measured velocity of money decreases.
Associated with the sluggish response of the aggregate price are some real expansionary e⁄ects of
money: In addition to the rise in aggregate consumption level, other variables such as aggregate
output, labor supply, and capital investment also increase after the monetary shock. Because agents
opt to maintain a target level of real wealth to provide just enough liquidity to balance the cost and
bene￿t of holding money, labor supply must increase to replenish real income when the price level
rises. If money injections are serially correlated, then investment will also increase to help sustain
future wealth level by enhancing labor productivity.34 These real expansionary e⁄ects of lump-sum
injections bene￿t cash-poor agents and may thus improve social welfare, which is reminiscent of the
redistributive e⁄ects of a lump-sum monetary injection discussed by Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford
(1992).








t). Suppose the real wage is constant under a transitory money injec-
tion. As long as the expected inverse of in￿ ation Et
Pt
Pt+1 rises, the rate of return to liquidity R must
fall. Hence, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ must decrease because @R
@￿￿ > 0. Since the function
D(￿￿)
H(￿￿) will decrease,
velocity must fall, o⁄setting the impact of the money injection on aggregate price.35
5 Welfare Costs of In￿ ation
Permanent changes in the money stock are no longer expansionary because of the anticipated
permanently higher cost of holding money under rational expectations. When Et
Pt
Pt+1 declines
under anticipated in￿ ation, the arguments in the previous section on transitory monetary shocks
are reversed. The rate of return to liquidity must increase to compensate for the cost of holding
money. Hence, the cuto⁄ ￿￿ must increase and demand for real balances must fall (recall @H
@￿￿ < 0).
In particular, when the expected in￿ ation rate is higher than the critical value ￿max, money will
cease to be accepted as a store of value, optimal money demand goes to zero, and the velocity of
money becomes in￿nity. Thus in￿ ation has an "adverse liquidity e⁄ect" on the economy: It reduces
the purchasing power of nominal balances, destroys the liquidity value of money, and therefore raises
the number of liquidity-constrained agents. When liquidity constraint binds, the insurance function
34The response of investment is negative if money injection is i:i:d because monetary shocks are like aggregate
demand shocks, so they promote consumption and crowd out investment. But if such shocks have certain degree of
persistence, agents will opt to save to enhance future consumption.
35It can be shown that
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H2 f[1 ￿ F]H ￿ FDg =
1
H2 fH ￿ ￿
￿Fg < 0:
24of money disappears and consumption can no longer be smoothed against idiosyncratic shocks.
To put things in perspective, consider the household￿ s optimal program in equation (1) without
money ￿ that is, money does not exist. In this case, agents have no insurance device to smooth
consumption against idiosyncratic shocks because labor income and capital investment are both
predetermined before the realizations of ￿t(i). However, it can be shown easily that the aggregate
variables in this economy have identical equilibrium paths to a representative-agent counterpart
economy where ￿t(i) = 1￿" for all i and t. To see this, the ￿rst-order conditions of the household




1 = wt ~ Et f[" + ￿t(i)]￿t(i)g (39)
1
wt




ct(i) = [" + ￿t(i)][(1 + rt)st￿1(i) + wtnt(i) ￿ st(i)]; (41)
where the last equation is the budget constraint. Since net wealth [(1 + rt)st￿1(i) + wtnt(i) ￿ st(i)]
is chosen before observing ￿t(i), it is independent of ￿t(i). Hence, the budget identity (41) implies
that the aggregate (or average) consumption is given by Ct = (1 + rt)St￿1 + wtNt ￿ St (recall
E (" + ￿) = 1). Equation (39) then implies 1
wt = ~ Et
"+￿t(i)
ct(i) = ~ Et
1
xt(i) = 1
Ct. Thus, the aggregate
allocation of this economy is identical to that without idiosyncratic uncertainty (i.e., when ￿(i) =
1 ￿ " for all i, we have ￿t(i) = 1
wt and ct(i) = wt = Ct). However, that these two economies
are identical in aggregate allocation does not at all imply that the welfare is the same across the
two economies because, with idiosyncratic uncertainty, agents are completely without consumption
insurance in one economy, whereas they are completely free of idiosyncratic uncertainty in the other
economy. This contrast helps to see the liquidity value of money and the implied welfare cost of
in￿ ation.
5.1 Measures of Welfare Costs
We measure the welfare costs of in￿ ation as the state-independent percentage increase (￿) in con-
sumption that would make each individual indi⁄erent in terms of expected utilities between having
a positive in￿ ation and the Friedman rule, ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1. By the law of large numbers, the aggregate





logc(i)dF. Thus our welfare measure also corresponds to a
25social planner￿ s measure. That is, the value of ￿ is determined by the equation,
Z




log ~ c(i)di ￿
Z
~ n(i)di; (42)
where ~ c(i) and ~ n(i) denote, respectively, the optimal consumption and labor supply of agent i under
the Friedman rule. Notice that ~ c(i) = ~ C is constant across agents under the Friedman rule. Solving
for ￿ gives
log(1 + ￿) = log ~ C ￿
Z
logc(i)dF + N ￿ ~ N; (43)
where ~ N is the aggregate labor supply under the Friedman rule.
Using the decision rules in equations (14) and (16), we have c(i) = minf" + ￿(i);" + ￿￿g
wR(￿￿)
"+￿￿ .
Since aggregate consumption is given by C =
D(￿￿)R(￿￿)
"+￿￿ w = DR
"+￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) Y
N, we have N = DR
"+￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) Y
C,
where the output-to-consumption ratio, Y
C =
1￿￿(1￿￿)
1￿￿(1￿￿)￿￿￿￿, is independent of in￿ ation. Under the
Friedman rule, we have R(￿￿) = 1;￿￿ = 0, and D(￿￿) = "; hence, ~ c(i) = w and ~ N = (1 ￿ ￿) Y
C.
That is, consumers are perfectly insured under Friedman rule. Therefore, the above equation can
be rewritten as
log(1 + ￿) = ￿
Z
log[minf" + ￿(i);" + ￿￿g]dF ￿log
R(￿￿)
" + ￿￿ +
￿
D(￿￿)R(￿￿)






where the last term is negative and re￿ ects welfare gains due to rises in leisure in the face of positive
in￿ ation (Cooley and Hansen, 1989).
With the generalized power distribution and integrating by parts, the ￿rst term in equation
(44) is given by
Z
￿<￿￿















F(￿￿) + log(" + ￿￿) +
"￿ [log(" + ￿￿) ￿ log"]
￿
" + ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ "￿ : (45)
Thus, the welfare cost is
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26Notice that as ￿ ! 0, the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks approaches in￿nity and the Gini
coe¢ cient of wealth distribution approaches 1, in which case the welfare cost of in￿ ation also
approaches in￿nity.
As a comparison, suppose we ignore idiosyncratic risk and (incorrectly) measure the welfare
cost by using average consumption (C =
R
c(i)di) as implied by the representative-agent literature,
we would obtain
log(1 + ￿o) = log ~ C ￿ logC + N ￿ ~ N (47)
as the welfare cost. In this case, when ￿ ￿ ￿max, we have C = ~ C = w;N = ~ N = (1 ￿ ￿) Y
C, and
Y = ~ Y . That is, the above incorrect measure of welfare cost would be zero under hyper-in￿ ation.
This shows that, even if the aggregate economy under hyper-in￿ ation may look identical to that
under the Friedman rule, the actual welfare can di⁄er dramatically between the two economies.
This di⁄erence in welfare arises precisely because in￿ ation has destroyed the liquidity value of
money and made agents unable to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks. It is this aspect of the
welfare costs of in￿ ation that is missed by the Bailey triangle.
On the other hand, as ￿ ! 1, the distribution of ￿(i) becomes degenerate with the entire
mass locating at ￿(i) = ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ = 1 ￿ ", so R(￿￿) = 1, D(￿￿) = 1, H(￿￿) = 0, and log(1 + ￿) = 0
according to equation (46). That is, without idiosyncratic risk, there is no welfare gain by holding
money; hence, the welfare cost of in￿ ation is zero under either measures.
5.2 Calibration
Since our model features money as the only ￿nancial asset providing self-insurance against idiosyn-
cratic shocks, it is more suitable for describing developing countries than for developed countries
because households in developed countries can smooth consumption also by borrowing or trading
nonmonetary assets in spot markets. The data in Table 1 (panel A) show that, in developing coun-
tries, the share of cash and bank deposits accounts for more than 90% of total ￿nancial wealth,
whereas this number is much smaller in developed countries. Hence, we ￿rst calibrate the model
based on developing-country data. One problem of this approach is that data for distribution of
money demand in developing countries are rarely available in the literature. As an alternative,
we calibrate the model to match the Gini coe¢ cients of consumption or health care expenditures
in developing countries based on data provided in Makinen et al. (2007). This is a reasonable
alternative because at the end it is the idiosyncratic movements in consumption that matter for
welfare.
The bottom panel (panel B) in Table 1 shows the Gini coe¢ cients for consumption expenditure
and health care expenditure in several developing countries. The average consumption Gini across
those countries is 0:43 and the average health care Gini is 0:4; these values are both signi￿cantly
27larger than the consumption Gini (0:28) in the United States. However, considering that cross-
household dispersion of consumption expenditure may overstate idiosyncratic risk for individuals
over time, to be conservative we assume the variance of household consumption over time is only
one third of that (dispersion) across households in developing countries; that is, we calibrate the
model to generate a consumption Gini of 0:133, instead of 0:4 ￿ 0:43.36
We set the parameters f￿;￿g to quarterly frequency with ￿ = 0:99 and ￿ = 0:025, so the
annual in￿ ation rate is 4￿. If ￿ = 0:5%, a combination of ￿ = 0:025 and " = 0:02 would yield a
consumption Gini of 0:133 in the model. We will use these parameter values as a benchmark to
assess the welfare costs of in￿ ation.
Table 1. Household Portfolio and Expenditure Inequality￿
A. Composition of Household Financial Wealth
France Germany Italy Japan Spain UK US
Liquid assets 33% 46% 40% 59% 40% 21% 15%
Shares & equities 32% 24% 39% 34% 38% 25% 39%
Other 35% 30% 21% 7% 22% 57% 46%
China India
Liquid assets 90% 92%
Shares & equities 6% 5%
Other 4% 3%
























Health care Gini 0:43 0:42 NA 0:67 0:18 0:32 0:38
￿Data source: For composition of ￿nancial wealth, see Davies et al. (2006, Tables 3 and 4).
Data for China are based on Yi and Song (2008). For the consumption and health care
expenditure, see Makinen et al. (2007).
The welfare implications of in￿ ation are graphed in Figure 5. The upper-left panel in Figure 5
shows the correct measure of welfare cost (￿). It is monotonically increasing with in￿ ation. Hence,
the Friedman rule is clearly optimal.37 The maximum welfare cost is reached at the maximum
36This assumption seems reasonable in light of the ￿ndings of Guvenen and Smith (2009), who estimate that in the
United States the measured income risk of individual households is about one third of the cross-household dispersion
in income.
37This result is in sharp contrast to Aiyagari (2005) where he shows that taxing the rate of return to capital is
optimal in an incomplete-market economy with uninsurable risk. In contrast, here it is shown that taxing the rate
of return to money is not optimal. The intuition for the di⁄erence is as follows. When agents use ￿xed capital as
a liquid asset to bu⁄er idiosyncratic shocks, precautionary saving motives lead to over-accumulation of aggregate
capital in equilibrium. As a result, the marginal product of (i.e., rate of return to) capital is too low compared
28in￿ ation rate ￿max = 531%, where ￿ = 1:86. Beyond this point agents stop holding money as a
store of value, so the welfare cost remains constant at 1:86 for ￿ ￿ ￿max. The upper-right panel
shows the incorrect measure of welfare cost based on average consumption (￿o). This measure is
not monotonic; it equals zero at two extreme points: the point of the Friedman rule and the point
where ￿ = ￿max. In the ￿rst case, individual consumption level is the highest because there is
no cost to holding money, so agents are perfectly insured against idiosyncratic risk. In the latter
case, individual consumption becomes homogeneous again and is back to the maximum level when
money is no longer held as a store of value. Without money, in￿ ation no longer has any adverse
liquidity e⁄ects on consumption, so ￿o remains at zero beyond ￿max.38
Figure 5. Welfare Costs, Money Demand, and Velocity
The bottom-left panel shows the level of aggregate money demand (M
P ), which monotonically
decreases with in￿ ation. At the maximum in￿ ation rate ￿max = 531%, the demand for real balances
with the modi￿ed golden rule. Hence, taxing the rate of return to capital will lower the aggregate capital stock and
raise the equilibrium interest rate to the golden-rule level. The higher interest rate will generate a positive income
e⁄ect on consumption that is more than enough to compensate for the loss in an individual￿ s welfare due to the
reduction in the bu⁄er stock. A key here is that individuals take the real interest rate as externally given but their
collective actions determine the level of the real interest rate in equilibrium. In my monetary model, the situation is
di⁄erent because the shadow rate of return to money (R(￿
￿)) is determined by the probability of liquidity constraint,
which is determined internally by an agent￿ s optimal choice of money holdings. Also, money does not a⁄ect capital
accumulation in my model. Hence, taxing the rate of return to money through in￿ ation will reduce welfare because
there are no externalities in the rate of return to money as in the case of Aiyagari (1995).
38When ￿ ￿ ￿max, we have R(￿ ￿) = " + ￿ ￿; D(￿ ￿) = 1; and H(￿ ￿) = 0, so C =
DR
"+￿ ￿w = w.
29becomes zero, and the velocity of money becomes in￿nity (bottom-right panel).39 The velocity of
money is the lowest under the Friedman rule, because people opt to hoard as much money as they
can when its rate of return equals the inverse of the time discounting factor. These implications for
money demand and velocity are very di⁄erent from standard CIA models, which imply an upper
bound of unity on velocity and a strictly positive lower bound on money demand, because agents
under the CIA constraint must hold money even with an in￿nite rate of in￿ ation. In the real world,
people often stop accepting domestic currency as the means of payment when the in￿ ation rate is
too high, consistent with the model.
Consider the welfare cost at the in￿ ation rate ￿max = 531%, where ￿ = 1:86: Although each
individual￿ s average consumption is the same as that under the Friedman rule, the social welfare
di⁄ers dramatically. When money is no longer held because in￿ ation is too high to bear, individuals
face completely uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty across states of nature, and they are willing
to reduce consumption by more than 65% to eliminate such uncertainty. In other words, people￿ s
consumption or income level must be more than 286% larger (since 1+￿ = 2:86) in order to accept
a 531% quarterly in￿ ation rate.
Even at moderate in￿ ation rates, the welfare cost is astonishingly large. For example, when
￿ = 1:5% (i.e., 10 percentage points above the Friedman rule in terms of annualized in￿ ation
rate), individuals￿consumption level must increase by 14:5% to make them indi⁄erent; and when
￿ = 2:5% (i.e., a 10% annual in￿ ation rate above zero), consumption must be increase by 12% to
make individuals indi⁄erent. Since most of the welfare loss happens near the Friedman rule, we
can also follow Lucas (2000) by computing the value of ￿ when annualized in￿ ation increases from
4% to 14%. The result is ￿ = 10%. Remember, most of the welfare losses come from the cash-poor
households.
On the other hand, if we use the incorrect measure ￿0, then the welfare cost of 10% annualized
in￿ ation is only 2% of GDP compared with zero in￿ ation, and it is only 1:3% of GDP when
in￿ ation rises from 4% to 14% a year. These numbers are similar (in the order of magnitude) to
those estimated by Lucas (2000). This indicates again that it is highly misleading to use aggregate
consumption or representative-agent models to measure the welfare costs of in￿ ation.
In a heterogeneous-agent economy with incomplete markets, the larger the variance of idiosyn-
cratic shocks, the stronger the precautionary motive for holding money. This raises the interest
elasticity of money demand because agents with larger nominal balances incur a disproportionately
higher in￿ ation tax. More importantly, higher in￿ ation shifts the mass of the distribution of money
demand toward zero balances by reducing cash holdings across agents, resulting in a larger portion
of the population without self-insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. This shift of the distribution
39The graph only shows velocity for ￿ < ￿max.
30of money demand in response to in￿ ation is most critical in generating the large welfare cost. To
show the importance of this extensive margin, Figure 6 graphs the relationship between in￿ ation
and the probability of a binding liquidity constraint (or the proportion of the liquidity-constrained
population). It shows that, as in￿ ation rises, the portion of the population holding zero balances
increases rapidly. For example, when annual in￿ ation increases from 2% to 10%, an additional 9%
of the entire population is left without cash (thus without self-insurance), raising the total number
of liquidity-constrained agents to about 37% of the population. When holding money is so costly,
the demand for real balances is so low so that the probability of a binding liquidity constraint is
very high. This amounts to large welfare losses.
Figure 6. Portion of Borrowing-Constrained Population
5.3 Alternative Calibration
Since money demand data are available in the United States, an alternative calibration is to choose
the parameters f￿;"g so that the model matches exactly the fraction of liquidity-constrained pop-
ulation in the United States. According to the Survey of Consumer Finances, the portion of
households having zero balances in checking accounts is 19:3% of the population based on surveys
in the years between 1989 and 2007 (with standard deviation of 1:3%), the portion of households
having less than $10 in checking accounts is 20% (with standard deviation of 1:4%), and that having
31less than $20 is 20:6% (with standard deviation 1:3%).40 Households with little balances in their
checking accounts also tend to have very little balances in other types of accounts, such as saving
accounts and money-market accounts. Hence, if we de￿ne a household with less than $10 in check-
ing accounts as liquidity constrained, the data suggest that 20% of the U.S. population is liquidity
constrained. This estimate is consistent with other independent empirical studies. For example,
Hall and Mishkin (1982) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and ￿nd that 20% of American
families are liquidity constrained. Mariger (1986) uses a life-cycle model to estimate this fraction to
be 19:4%. Hubbard and Judd (1986) simulate a model with a constraint on net worth and ￿nd that
about 19:0% of United States consumers are liquidity constrained. Jappelli (1990) uses information
on individuals whose request for credit has been rejected by ￿nancial intermediaries and estimates
through a Tobit model that 19:0% of families are liquidity constrained. Therefore, the emerging
consensus points to a fraction of approximately 20% of the population to be liquidity constrained.
To generate a 20% fraction of liquidity-constrained population in the model under the parameter
value of ￿ = 0:99 and the annual in￿ ation rate of 2%, it requires ￿ = 0:27 and " = 0:05. These
parameter values imply that the Gini of money demand in the model is only 0:57 and that of
consumption is only 0:08, which is 2
7 of the actual consumption Gini in the United States and
looks a reasonable measure of the individual consumption risk across time for the average U.S.
households. With these parameter values, the welfare cost of 10% annualized in￿ ation is 8:2% of
consumption.
6 Conclusion and Remarks for Further Research
This paper provides a tractable general-equilibrium model of money demand. The model is designed
to isolate the store-of-value function of money from its other functions and is applied to study the
dynamics of velocity, the monetary business cycle, and especially the welfare costs of in￿ ation
in an environment where ￿nancial markets are incomplete and interest-bearing assets are either
unavailable or highly illiquid for households to smooth consumption against idiosyncratic shocks
that are not fully insurable. The most important ￿ndings include (i) the aggregate velocity of money
can be extremely volatile and is countercyclical to money supply in the short run but procyclical
to in￿ ation in the long run, as in the data; (ii) transitory monetary shocks have positive real e⁄ects
despite their lump-sum nature and ￿ exible prices; and (iii) the welfare costs of in￿ ation can be
astonishingly high ￿ at least 8% of consumption under 10% annual in￿ ation.
Two simplifying strategies allow the generalized Bewley (1980) model to be analytically tractable.
First, the idiosyncratic shocks come from wealth rather than from labor income. Second and more
40On the other hand, the portion of households with balances greater than $3;000 in checking accounts is larger
than 32% (with standard deviation of 2:2%).
32importantly, the utility function is linear in leisure. These simplifying strategies make the expected
marginal utility of an individual￿ s consumption and the cuto⁄ value for target wealth independent
of idiosyncratic shocks and individual histories. With these properties, closed-form decision rules
for individuals￿consumption and money demand can be derived explicitly and aggregation becomes
easy. After aggregation by the law of large numbers, the variables form a system of nonlinear dy-
namic equations as in a representative-agent RBC model. The stability of this nonlinear system
can be checked by traditional eigenvalue method. Hence, traditional solution methods available
in the RBC literature can be applied to solving the model￿ s equilibrium saddle path, given the
distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks. The impulse response functions to aggregate shocks and
the second (or higher) moments of the model can then be computed in a tractable way.
These simplifying strategies have some costs. First, the i:i:d: assumption of idiosyncratic shocks
rules out any persistence in the distribution of wealth and money demand. However, adopting the
approach in Wang and Wen (2010) with discrete distribution may overcome this problem. Another
cost is that the elasticity of labor supply is not a free parameter. This imposes some limits on the
model￿ s ability to study labor supply behavior and labor market dynamics. Nonetheless, the payo⁄
of the simplifying assumptions is signi￿cant: They not only make the model analytically tractable
with closed-form solutions for individuals￿decision rules, but also reduce the computational costs to
the level of solving a representative-agent RBC model despite nontrivial distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks and endogenous production with capital. Because of this, the model may prove very useful
in applied work.
However, there may be at least two potential objections to the large welfare cost of in￿ ation
found in this paper. First, the model features uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and money is the
only liquid asset to help self-insure against such risk. This setup rules out other types of insurance
devices and, especially, does not take into account the role of banking in mitigating the idiosyncratic
risk through borrowing and lending. Second, it is a common belief of the existing literature that
in￿ ation bene￿ts debtors by redistributing the burden of in￿ ation toward creditors. For these
reasons, the welfare costs of in￿ ation may be overstated in the paper.
To address some of these concerns, Wen (2009a) extends the general-equilibrium Bewley model
to a setting with "narrow banking," where cash-rich agents can deposit their idle cash into a
bank, and cash-constrained agents can borrow from the bank by paying nominal interest. My
analysis therein shows that (i) ￿nancial intermediation can dramatically improve social welfare;
(ii) the expansionary real e⁄ects of transitory money injections can be greatly magni￿ed by the
credit channel of money supply through ￿nancial intermediation; (iii) however, the welfare cost
of in￿ ation remains astonishingly high despite the possibility of borrowing and lending (i.e., risk
sharing) at market-determined interest rates for credit. The intuition is as follows. Financial
intermediation ampli￿es the real e⁄ects of transitory monetary shocks because the injected liquidity
33can be reallocated from cash-rich agents to cash-poor agents through the banking system via
borrowing and lending. This generates a signi￿cant and persistent liquidity e⁄ect on the nominal
and real interest rates of loans. However, permanent money growth is still highly costly.41 Even
though ￿nancial intermediation promotes risk sharing and alleviates liquidity constraints, it cannot
completely eliminate idiosyncratic risk because of positive nominal interest rate. That is, the
banking system cannot undo the adverse liquidity e⁄ects of in￿ ation, not only because in￿ ation
reduces money demand (thus diminishing the insurance function of money) but also because it
increases the costs of borrowing ￿ the nominal interest of loans rises with in￿ ation more than one-
for-one.42 Hence, in￿ ation always generates an "adverse liquidity e⁄ect" on the economy regardless
of ￿nancial intermediation, and it is precisely the higher interest costs of loans that may make
debtors worse o⁄(instead of better o⁄) in the face of positive in￿ ation (o⁄setting the redistributive
e⁄ects).
This paper does not consider the welfare costs of in￿ ation in situations where money is required
as a medium of exchange in addition to being a store of value. Wen (2009b) studies a general-
equilibrium version of the Lucas (1980) model where money is held both as a store of value and as
a means of payment. There I show that the welfare costs of in￿ ation, especially hyperin￿ ation, are
larger than those in this paper (other things equal), because in CIA models, agents are not able to
get rid of money even when holding cash becomes extremely costly.
This research provides only a rough measure of the welfare costs of in￿ ation by taking into
account the precautionary motives of money demand. Although this is an important ￿rst step
toward more accurate measures of the welfare costs of in￿ ation, an obvious shortcoming of the
current model is that it implies that the cross-household dispersion of money demand is the same
as its cross-time variation. Hence, if the model is calibrated to match the Gini coe¢ cients of cross-
household distributions, it tends to overstate the over-time variation; and when it is calibrated
to match the over-time variation, it tends to understate the cross-household dispersion. Since
both margins are important for properly assessing the heterogeneous liquidity e⁄ects of in￿ ation, a
critical line of future research requires (i) better panel data for consumption and money demand,
especially for developing countries, so that both the cross-household dispersion and the cross-time
variation of money demand can be estimated; and (ii) a richer model that is able to match both
the across-section and the cross-time properties of the panel data. Currently, panel data with a
long enough time dimension is extremely di¢ cult to ￿nd, especially for developing countries.43 As
41That is, given in￿ ation rate, ￿nancial intermediation improves welfare signi￿cantly; but given ￿nancial interme-
diation, in￿ ation is still very costly.
42Wen (2009a) shows that the nominal interest rate of credit in the money market can di⁄er fundamentally from
the nominal interest rate of nonmonetary assets with incomplete ￿nancial markets.
43The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) may be one of the best panel data source available to date, but
even this data archive does not track exactly the same households for their income and consumption over a su¢ ciently
long period of time, let alone information on money demand.
34panel and longitudinal data with better qualities develop, the estimated welfare costs of in￿ ation
in this paper can be further re￿ned.
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